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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
ALICE LOOS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
MOUNTAIN ~DEL SUPPLiY
OOMPANY, a corporation, and
UTAH MOTOR PARK, INCORBORATIDD, a corporation,

No. 6211

Defen&ants and Appellants.

Brief of Appellant Utah Motor Park, Inc.
S.TATEMENT OF THE OA:SE
This is an action brought by plaintiff to recover
damages for personal injurie·s ·claimed to have been received by plaintiff as the result of a gas explosion upon
the premises of defendant Utah Motor Park, hereinafter
referred to as the Motor Park. The defendant Mountain
Fuel Supply Company, hereinafter referred to as the
Gas Company, is joined as a:n alleged joint tort-feasor as
the supplier of the gas which caused the explosion.
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During winter months the cottages of the Motor
Park .are rented out to tenants for housekeeping purposes
by the week and month. Plaintiff and her husband were
tenants of caibin 403 upon a weekly basis, having just paid
rental for the second week when the explosion o:ccurred.
Their cabin consisted of a kitchen, ·Combined living and
bedroom .and a bathroom. Within the cottage, in addition to a bed, chairs, table and kitchen equipment, there
was a gas range in the kitchen and a gas heater in the
living room. The range had to be lighted with a match
and the gas heater was what is known as a floor heater
with .a pilot light, and there was a handle on the furnace
to regulate the gas. All appliances within the cottage
were operated by the tenant.
A number of ·other cottages at the Motor Park similarly equipped were rented to permanent tenants by the
week or mont!h. In each instan:ce all appliances and facilitie-s were under the exclusive ;control of the tenants.
The cabins were constructed in pairs, with a garage
separating each pair of cottages from other cottages in
the same group. (,See Exhibit I f.o.r illustration).

T'he

Loos cabin .faced west and was known as cottage 403. The
adjoining cottage on the east was known as No. 303 and
was ·occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler. Only a partition
separated the Loos cottage from the W heeler cottage.
1

Immediately south of the Wheeler cottage and separated
from it by a garage was cottage 304, ·OC1cupied ·by Mr. and
Mrs. Bussell.
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Gas for use in the Motor Park was supplied by the
defendant Gas Company. 'T'he Motor Park re-ceived this
supply through two separate iTistallations of mains and
pipes: One for heating purposes and a different one for
cooking purposes. George Lindholm, manager of the
Motor Park, testified that there was a meter at the entrance to the Motor Park for the domestic supply which
was used for cooking, and another meter for the industrial supply used for heating, which was located in the
office 'building. Ga·s was used in approximately 112 out
of the 125 ·cabins. All of the cottages in the immediate
vicinity of the Lo·os cottage were equipped with appliances for both heating and cookiTig.
In the operation of these gas facilities by tenants of
the Motor Park there were occasions when leaks would
develop in the appliances, and a.s a result there were occasions when odors o.f gas would be reported to the office ·of the :M-otor Park. All employees of the Motor Park
had instructions that if there were any gas leaks or reports -of gas odors that the Ga.Js Company should be called
immediately. The Oas ·Company then .sent a service man
to take care of it. Excepting for ma.j·or repairs where
broken pipes had to be replaced or where there was defective equipment all repairs were made by the Gas Company. This practice wa.s followed in each and every instance where a ·leak was reported or a gas odor detected.
In renting cottages employees of the Motor Park
would make an inspection and instruct the tenant with
reference to operation of the appliances.

The Motor
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Park had nothing to do with operation ·of the facilities
or appliances within the cottages. ·Thos·e appliances and
facilities were operated by the tenants themselves. The
only time the employees of the Motor Park operated the
appliances wa.s when the ·cottages were first occupied, at
which time they would light the pilot light, if it was not
already lighted, and instruct the tenants with reference
to the manner of operation. ·The M·otor Park had nothing
to .do with the regulation of the .supply of gas to the
Park 'This was under the exelusive control of the defendant Gas Oompany.
·Each 1cotta.ge had a vent in the foundation leading to
the area beneath the floor. There was also a .four inch
gas vent from ~the gas furnace out through the roof.

An explosion occurred in the Loos cottage on Jannary 22, 1938, a.s a. result of which plaintiff was injured.
The cause of the explosion i·s unknown. No evidence was
given by any witness upon that subject matter.
Details as to speci:fie evidence as applied to the particular allegations in the pleadings will be discussed and
considered in connection wit:h the respe1ctive assignments
·of error.

Gomes now the defendant and appellant Utah Motor
Park, Incorporated, a corporation of the .State of Utah,
a:nd respectfully says that there is manifest error in the
record, proce·edings and judgment of the trial court in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the above entitled cause, and respectfully assigns errors
as follows, to-wit:

I.
The trial court erred in denying the motion of .said
defendant Utah Motor Park, Incorporated, for a judgment of non""'suit; that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain .or justify the decision and order of said Court
in this, that the plaintiff failed to establish any ne.gligence of said defendant as alleged in the eomplaint whLch
proximately caused or contributed to the accident or injury in said cause; that plaintiff failed to prove tha.t any
pipes or ·CO'Ilnections within or about the premises of said
defendant became cracked or broken or developed leaks
and permitted gas to escape into or under the floor of
the apartment occupied by plaintiff, and wholly failed to
prove or establish by any ·evidence whatsoever that any
gas from a ·cracked, broken, or leaky pipe, ·Or connection
escaped into or under the floor of said apartment, and
wholly failed to prove or establish by any evidence that
any gas from any cracked, br·oken, leaky or defective
pipe or connection caused the explosion in question in
said cause; that plaintiff wholly failed to establish or
prove by .any evidence whatsoever that after the construction of said building defendant carelessly, negligently, or otherwise excavated a pit for the installation, and
installed, a furnace at or near the eenter of said building
and •so near the foundation and support of said building
under the partition separating said apartment as to permit the same to settle and the weight thereof to rest
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

upon the pipes furnishing gas to the furnatee and projecting. through the partition between the apartments;
that plaintiff wholly failed to establish or prorve that said
defendant carelessly and negligently failed and neglected
to provide proper and sufficient ventilation for the area
under said apartments, and carelessly and negligently
closed or permitted the small-opening provided as ventilators to be closed and obstructed; that on the contrary
plaintiff's own ev~dence established the contrary thereof;
that plaintiff wholly failed to establish by any competent
evidence that defendant failed .and omitted to make frequent inspection of said pipes, ·Connections, O·r premises;
plaintiff failed to establish by any evidence that defendant continued to furnish gas under pressure to the apartm·ent ·Occupied by plaintiff after it knew or should have
known that any pipes were broken, defective, and leaking gas, and that the ventilators thereof were clos·ed and
obstructed, but on the contrary plaintiff's evidenc-e affirmatively showed that any gas so furnished to plaintiff
was furnished by defendant Mountain Fuel iSupply Company, a ·corporation; and wholly failed to establish or
prove ·by .any competent evidence that any pipes were
broken, defective and leaked, .and wholly .failed to establish by any evidence that the ventilators thereof were
closed and obstructed; that plaintiff further failed to establish by any ·competent evidence that any act, deed, or
omission ·of .said defendant proximately caused or 00ntributed to any accident ·Or injury to plaintiff; that plaintiff
failed to establish or prove iby any competent evidence
that there was any defect whatsoever in the premises ocSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cupied by plaintiff, and wholly failed to prove 'O'r establish by any evidence that defendant knew or should have
known of the existence of any .such alleged defect or defective condition. ('Tr. 268, 269, Ab. p. 54, 55.)

II.
That the Court erred in giving instruction Number
2. That the evidence to sustain or justify the giving of
such instruction was insufficient; that there w:as no evidence whatsoever to the effect that this defendant was
supplying gas to the premises o0cupied by plaintiff; that
on the contrary the uncontradicted evidence ~showed and
established that said defendant was the landlord and that
plaintiff was a tenant of said premise.s. ( Tr. 315, 3'23, 324,
Ab. p. 89, 97, 98.)

III.
That the Court erred in the g1.v1ng of instruction
number 4. That the evidence to justify or sustain the
giving of such instruction was insufficient; that said instruction implies and infers that plaintiff had presented
.some evidence to the effect that the system of pipes within the premrses of defendant Utah M.otor Park was defective, leaking, and that gas was escaping therefrom,
and that gas coming from defective or leaking pipes
caused the explosion a~nd injury to plaintiff; that there
was no evidence in said cause that any pipes whatsoever
were leaking or defe1etive, and that there was no evidence
whatsoever that gas from any such 'Source caused the explosion or injury; that if there was any evidence whatSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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soever, which defendant denies, of the fact that any pipes
were defective or leaking, that said instruction assumed
and imputed the existence of such facts instead of permitHng the jury to~ find with reference thereto. (Tr. 316,
324, A b. p. 89, 90, 98.)

IV.
The Court erred 'in giving instruction number 10.
That the evidence to justify or sustain the giving of such
instruction was insufficient; that the Court assumed that
it was established by the evidence that there was no conflict with reference thereto that gas was escaping in or
under -cabins 303 or 403 prior to the time of the explosion;
that in making .such assumption the ·Court took said question .from the jury instead of leaving it for the jury to
determine, whether gas was escaping in or under the
said ·Caiblins prior to the ·explosion. (Tr. 319, 324, Ab. p.
93, 98.)

v.
The Court erred in giving instruction number 11.
That the evidence to justify and sustain the giving of
such instruction is insufficient; said instruction assumes
that there were leaks and defects in the servi·ce pipes of
defendant Utah Motor Park; that there was no evidence
with reference thereto, or if there was any evidence with
reference thereto it was for the jury to find as a fact. tTr.
319, 3·24, A b. p. 93, 98.)
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VI.
The Court erred in the giving ·of instruction number
12. That the evide·nce to justify and sustain the giving
of such instruction was insufficient; said instruction implies, infers, and states that there was a defect in the gas
pipes 'Or appliances under or in cabins 303 or 403 of defendant Utah Motor Park, Incorporated, and implies, infers, and states that gas e.s·c.aped therefrom which resulted in the explosion and injury to plaintiff; that there was
no evidence ·of •any defect in the gas linHs or appliances;
that there wa1s no evidence that tlhe gas which caused the
explosion .and injury to plaintiff was from any such alleged defect in the gas lines or appliances; that if there
was any such evidence that it was an i·ssue of fact to be
found by the jury, and that the Court erred in instructing
the jury that such defect existed and that gas from such
source caused the explosion and resulted in the injury
to plaintiff. (Tr. 319, 320, 324, 325, Ab. p. 93, 94, 98, 99.)

VII.
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested instruction number 1. ( Tr. 40, 325, A b. p. 77,
99.)

VIII.
The Court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction number 2. That the evidence to justify and sustain the refusal of the Court to give said instruction is insufficient; that the ullJeontradicted and affirmative .evidence in said eause was to the effect that all
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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appliances, pipes and connections within ~said premises
were under the exclusive contr~ol of plaintiff and other
tenants in said premises, and that the gas used in said
premises was being supplied by defendant Mountain
Fuel Supply Company. (Tr. 41, 325, A:b. p. 77, 99.)

IX.
That the Court erred in refusing to give requested
instrlfction numher 2-A. (Tr. 411/2, 325, Ab. p. 77, 78, 99.)

X.
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested instruction number 4. ( Tr. 44, 325, A b. p. 78,
79, 99.)

XI.
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's
r·equested instruction number 7. ('Tr. 48, 32:5, Ab. p. 79,
80, 99.)

XII.
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested instruction number 8. ('Tr. 49, 325, Ab. p. 80,
99.)

XIII.
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested instruction number 9. ( Tr. 50, 3'2.5, Ab. p. 80,
81, 99.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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XIV.
That the Court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested instruction nun1her 10. (Tr. 51, 325, Ab. p. 81,
82, 99.)
XV.
That the Court erred in denying the motion of said
defendant Utah Motor Park, Incorporated, for a new
trial.

That the evidence tn justify and sustain the de-

cision of the Court in denying said motion is insufficient
in the particulars set forth herein with reference to
denial of the motion for non-suit, to whieh reference is
hereby made and by .such reference made a part here·o:f.
('Tr. 91, 92, 101, Ab. p. 102, 103, 104.)

QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR DE·TIDRMINATION.
POINT I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO T AK.E THE CASE
TO THE JURY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK?

POINT II.
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAD NO
APPLICABILITY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III.
DID THE COURT ERR IN REPE'ATE'DLY ASSUMING AND STATING TO THE JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE
SYSTEM OF PIPES WITHIN THE MOTOR PARK WAS DE~,ECTIVE,

LEAKLNG,

AND

THAT GAS

WAS

ESCAPING

THJ£REFROM, AND THAT THE GAS WHICH CAUSED THE
EXPLOSION AND INJURY TO PLAINTIFF CAME FROM DE~,ECTIVJ!J

OR LEAKING PIPES?

POINT IV.
DID THE COURT ERR IN HOLDING THE MOTOR PARK TO THE
SAME DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY AS THE GAS COMpANY AS A SUPPLIER OF GAS?

POLNT V.
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY

THAT THE MOTOR PARK AS LANDLORD IS NOT LIABLE
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF LATENT OR HIDDEN DEFECTS
OR

UNKNOWN

OR

UNSAFE

CONDITIONS

UPON

THE

PREMISES, AND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF WARRANTY
THE PLAINTIFF TOOK THE PROPERTY AND RENTED THE
CABIN SUBJECT TO ALL HIDDEN OR LATENT DEFECTS
OF WHICH THE MOTOR PARK HAD NO KNOWLEDGE, AND
THAT IF THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED BY THE UNEXPECTED BREAKING OR GIVING WAY OF SOME JOINT, PIPE,

OR CONNECTION NO LIABILITY WOULD EXIST ON THE
PART OF THE MOTOR PARK?
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POINT VI.
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO TAKE FROM THE JURY
CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN ALLEGED ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE MOTOR PARK WITH
REFERENCE TO WHICH THERE WAS

NO EVIDENCE?

POINT I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE CASE
TO THE JURY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK?
(Assignments of Error I and VII).

At the ·conclusion of plaintiff's case defendant made
a motion for judgment of non.Jsuit which was denied. At
the end of the trial defendant requested the trial court
to direct the jury to return a verdict in favor of defendant, no ·cause of .action. This request was denied. Defendant contends that both of these rulings were erroneous.
·There IS no dispute between the parties as to the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant. In paragraph 4 of the complaint plaint·iff alleges that she was a
ten:ant of defendant. The oourt in instruction No. VI
instructed the jury that it is undisputed that the relationship between plaintiff and defendant Utah Motor Park,
Inc., was that of landlord and tenant, and they were in
structed that such was the relationship.
The acts of neg~igence upon w.hich plaintiff relied
are .set forth in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the compl·aint.
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Briefly ·stated they are as follows: That the cottage was
heated by means of a gas furnace installed in a pit or
excav-ation under the floor near the center of the building and the partition dividing the apartment from the
one a.t the east end of the building ; that the furnace was
equipped with a pilot light kept constantly burning, and
that in installing the furnace the pipes and connections
for the same were projected through the partition be·tween the east and west apartments. It is alleged that
the defendants knew or should have known that the pipes
and connections would become cracked and broken or
otherwise develop leaks .and permit gas to escape into
the apartment or into the are·a under the floor thereof, and that it was the duty of defendants to avoid pla~
1ng or permitting weight or stress upon the pipes, or
to so place them that they might be cracked or broken,
and to avoid making alterations or repairs in such manner as to cause the building to settle upon or put stress
upon the pipes and cause breaks or leaiks therein. It
is also alleged that it was the duty of defendants to
make frequent and careful inspection of the pipes for
the s·afety and protection ·of the tenants, and that it was
likewise their duty to provide proper and sufficient
ventilation of the area under ~he floor so that any gas
which might leak could esc:ape freely. It is then alleged
that after construction of t~he building defendant did the
foUowing: (a) Excavated a pit for the furnace at or
near the center ·of the building and so near the foundation as to permit the building to settle and the weight to
rest upon the pipe·s furnishing gas to the furnace, which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pipes projected through the partition between the cottages; and (b) failed and neglected to provide proper and
sufficient ventilation for the area under the apartment;
and (e) closed or permitted the small openings provided
as v.entila tors to be closed and obstructed; and (d) failed
and omitted to make frequent or any inspection of the
pipes; and (e) continued to furnace gas under pressure
after they knew or should have known that the pipes were
broken, defective and leaking gas.
Let us now first se·e what, if any, ev,idence there was
to sustain any of those allegations of negligence each
and all of \Yhich were put in issue by the answer of defendant Motor Park.
Not a witness of any kind testified to the effect that
the pit for the furnace was anywhere near the center of
the building. In fact no one testified upon the .subject
matter at all and we call upon plaintiff to produce a
reference in the record to any such evidence. Nor did
anyone testify to the effect that the building settled or
that the pipes proj-ecting through the partition became
cracked or broken; nor did anyone testify to the effect
that the gas which caused the explosion came from a
leak in any pipes. In fact no one testified at all upon
the subject as to· where the gas eame from which caused
the explosion, namely: whether it came from an open
gas jet from one of the appliances operated by the tenants themselves; whether it came from a leak in the
pipes ; whether it was sewer gas from some source outside of or beyond the cottage ; or whether it was natural
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gas finding its way into the -are.a heneath the cottage from
leaks in the gas main at ~some point wholly unknown to
anyone. There was absolutely no evidence given by any
wi'tness upon this subject matter. Certain it is that if,
as testified to by Mrs. Loos and her husband,· this explosion occurred beneath the floor of the ·cottage, then
certainly there wa,s no leak in the pipes projecting
through the partition at a point above the floor hecause
gas rises and would not find its way from a point above
the floor down into the area beneath the floor.
As to ventilation beneath the cottage the evidence
is uncontradicted as given by Mr. Loos (.A:b. 29) and Mr.
Lindholm, manager of the Motor Park (Ab. 65), to the
effHct that there was a vent 4 in. x 8 in. in ,size in the
foundation to each ·of these cottages. No one testified
that these vents were in any way insufficient, nor did
anyone testify that they were -closed, and on the contrary
plaintiff's own witness, namely. her husband, testified
that they were open.
As to inspection of the premises the uncontradicted
evidence (Ab. 28) was to the effect that a representative
of the company went with plaintiff and her husband to
the cottage at the time when it was rented, and there was
nothing which occurred subsequent thereto which called
for any additional inspection or any inspection in addition to that which was given. We s'hall discuss the sufficiency of this particular allegation of negligence hereafter.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This ealls for consideration of only one other additional alleged ground of negligence, namely, continuing
to furnish gas under pressure after it knew or should
have known that the pipes were broken, defective and
leaking gas. As to this particular allegation of negligence we respectfully .submit that it has nothing wha tsoever to do with the defendant Motor Park since nowhere
is there an allegation to the effect that the Motor Park
was furnishing any gas, but on the contrary the amended
complaint, paragraph 2, alleges that the defendant gas
company was engaged in the business of supplying the
gas in question, and in paragraph 3 of the complaint it
is again expressly alleged that the apartment in question
was ·supplied with gas from the system of pipes of the
defendant gas company. The only witness who testified
upon the subject was George Lindholm, manager of defendant, who testified (Ab. G6) that "the Utah Motor
Park had nothing to do with the regulation .o.f the supply
of gas to the park''.
The extent and character of responsibility which the
landlord ·owes toward a tenant so far as liability for damages is concerned is so well established in this State that
it is not necessary to go beyond our own decisions for
the law.

In the case of Hatzis v. United Stales Fuel Company
decided in 1933, 82 Utah 38, 21 Pa:c. (2d) 86'2, it was
stated as follows :
'·'The gist ,of the negligence charged in the
complaint is that defendant, as the landlord well
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence should have known, of the presence of
•the caps in the cupboard, where found by plaintiff, and negligently failed to remove them or to
warn plaintiff or his family of their presence. We
find no evidence in t:his record directly proving
or tending to prove that the defendant either
·stored the caps in the place where found or knew
tha:t they were there, or that any ·Of its agents,
servants, or employees placed them in the cupboard or knew or their presence therein. There is
therefore no liability on defendant as landlord
unless the law imposes the duty on it to inspect the
·pre-mises to discover the hidden explosives and
to remove them or to warn plaintiff and his family
of their presence. We are sa tisfi.ed the la.w imposes no such duty on the landlord. The rule applicable is well stated in 16 R. C. L. 775, as follows:
'In the absence of warranty, deceit,
or fraud on the part of a landlord, the rule
of caveat emptor applies to leases of real
estate, the control of which passes to the
tenant, and it is the duty of the tenant to
make examination of the demised premises
to determine their safety and adaptability
to the purpo·ses for which they are hired.
Hence, for personal injuries received by
him from latent defects therein, of whieh
the landlord :had no knowledge at the time
of the lease the latter cannot be held responsible.'
And at page 777 :
'According to the weight of authority
an owner of property, unaffected by a public use, does not owe to his prospective
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nary care at the time of leasing to discover
and apprise him ·of unknown defects which
the lessee could equally well find out for
himself.'
To similar effect are other authorities: 36 C.
J. -!3; 2 Underhill, Landlord & Tenant, 784; 1
Tiffany, Landlord & Tenant, 556; 18 A. & E. Enc.
of Law ( 2d Ed.) 225; 1 Thompson on Negligence,
sec. 1130. ''
·This case but reaffirmed the doctrine laid down in

Wilson v. Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 Pac. 368, which was
an action involving injuries to a tenant arising out of
structural defects in the wall of a bUilding. This court
denied liability and esta·blished the following proposition of law:
'''The general proposition is well settled that
in the absence of warranty, deceit, or fraud on the
part of the landlord, the lessee takes the risk of
the quality of the premises, and cannot make the
landlord answerable for any injuries sustained by
·him during his occupancy by reason ·of the defective condition of the premises or their faulty
construction. Doyle v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 147
U. S. 413, 13 S. Ct. 33, 37 L. E'd. 223; Reams v.
Taylor, 31 Utah 288, 87 P. 1089, 120 Am. St. Rep.
930; Walsh v. Schmidt, 206 Mass. 405, 92 N. E.
~96, 34 L. R. A. (N . .S.) 798, and annotation following.''
That case in turn was founded upon principles established in the case ·Of Reams v. TaY'lor, 31 Utah 288, 87
Pac. 1089.
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As is so pointedly and decisively stated, in the case
of landlord and tenant there is absolutely no duty of inspection after the tenancy commences on the part of the
landlord. The reason for the rule is obvious. The tenant has exclusive pos·session of the premises and has exclusive operation of the facilities and appliances within
the premises. The tenant has more intimate opportunity
to dete:ct the presence of anything wrong in or about the
premises than has the landlord, who, from the nature
of the tenancy, is excluded from any right of entry whats-oever.
It is no answer to this proposition that .some other
or different relations,hip might have existed between
these particular parties. Plaintiff alleged the relationship and the trial court upon that allegation instructed
the jury that t'he relationship of landlord and tenant
existed between these parties. Also in instruction No.
VII the trial court recognized the law as set forth in
those ·decisions to which we hav·e referred.
This law has been applied in several cases involving
gas explosions where the relationship of landlord and
tenant exists.
In the case of Price v. MacThwaite Oil & Co., et al.,
(Okla. 193,6) 61 Pac. (2d) 177, an action was commenced
by plaintiff against the gas company and landlord. Gas
es-caping from an open pipe under the floor of the premises ·Caused an explosion and plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff alleged that as to the landlord it was the duty of the
owner of the pr;operty to kee-p the same in safe condition.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied liability 1n the
following language:
''As to defendant, Annie R. Carrell, plaintiff
contends that there was error in sustaining the
demurrer, and asserts, 'it is our contention t·hat
the ·owner of premises must keep same in a safe
condition f.or its tenants and other persons invited
thereon. That it was the duty of said defendant
to inspect the gas line .serving her property and
see that there were no le·a'ks or uncapped pi pes
eonnec.ted therewith at the time she let plaintiff
thereon as her tenant.' ''

* * * * * *
''The generaJl rule to which no exception is
called to our attention is: 'A landlord who, without covenanting to repair, and without knowledge
of latent defects, puts a tenant into full possession and control of demised premises, not intended
for public purposes, and which are free from defects ·Of construction constituting a nuisance, will
not be liable for personal injuries sustained on the
demised premises by reason of the defective condition thereof, by the tenant, members of his family, employees, guests of invitees, or others entering upon the premises under the tenant's title.'
36 c. J. 204.
''In Miller et ux. v. Vance Lumber Co., 167
Wash. 348, 9 P. (2d) 351, 352, it is said: 'It is the
settled rule of law in this state, prevailing generally in the United States and England, that:
'' * * * In the absence of ex.press contract to
the contrary, a tenant takes the demised premises
as he finds them and there is no implied warrHnty
'by the landlord that they are safe or fit for the
purpose for which they are hired. The maxim
caveat emptor applies." ' ''
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Nelson v. Myers, (CaL) 270 Pac. 719. T•his was an
apartment house case where asphyxiation was c1aimed
to have been caused by defective automatic gas heater,
used in the bathroom. There was, as here, conflicting
evidence as to whether or not the landlord had had any
notice at all of circumstances which might or could arouse
suspicion. T·here, as here, the landlord had delivered
possession of the property to the tenant. There, as here,
the tenant failed to prove the cause of the injury, namely, the souree of the gas causing the asphyxiation, to-wit,
whether from a defective pipe ·or some other source and
where, as in this case, they failed to .prove the source of
the gas which .caused the explosion. The Court of Appea,ls of the T·hird District of California denied liability
in the following language:
''As a proximate cause ·of death, the appellants relied upon their theory that the ventilating pipe, which was intended to connect the gas
heater with the aperture in the ceiling and thus
convey the noxious gases into the outer air, had
ibeen displaced so as to discharge the poison into
the bathroom. T.he complaint alleged:
"'That 'there existed ·On the water heater *
* * a vent pipe * * * intended to collect
said noxious gases * * * and convey the same
into a flue, (eommuni.cating) with the outside air.
* * * That said water heater and gas flame
were in a bad state of repair and dangerous in
thi·s, that the said vent pipe had become disconnected and * * * conveyed the said no!Xious and
deadly gases so generated by said ga.s flame and
discharged the same into .said ·bathroom.'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

''The appellants utterly failed to prove the
displacement of this vent pipe at the time of the
accident. 'There is no evidence in the record that
the vent pipe was found disconne:cted, or even that
the gas heater was found lighted when the body
of the deceased warS discovered. Upon the contrary, there is evidence that the transom over the
bathroon1 door was found to be open a few inches,
and there was no evidenc-e of the odor of gas in
the room. The total failure to prove the proximate caus-e of death as alleged and relied upon
by the appellants is fatal to their cause. In 20
Standard Encyclopedia of Procedure, 322, it is
said: '_,_~ variance between the allegations of the
complaint, and the proof as to the proximate cause
of the injury is fatal.' Certainly a substantial
and material variance in that regard wiH defeat
the recovery of a complainant. The jury may not
be permitted to spe~ulate as to the producing
cause -of death. 19 Cal. Jr. 69'6, sec. 118; Puckha.ber v. Southern P.ac. Co., 13'2 Cal. 363, 64 P. 480;
Hopkins v. Heller, 59 Cal. App. 447, 210 P. 975.
1

*

*

*

* * *

''The ~chief -contenti~on of the appellant in this
case is t~hat the respondent, as the landlord of
!Sunnyside Apartments, is liable for damages resulting to a tenant from defects of a gas heater
used as a part of the equipment of the rented
premises, particularly since he assumed the responsibility of repairing such defects. It is doubtful whether the respondent was required to clean
or repair the gas heater unde~r the covenants of
the lease which provided, 'The lessee agrees to
make all minor repairs at his own expense' Cleaning the gas burner,s, replacing the screen, or adjusting the vent pipe appear to be 'minor repairs',
which could be done with little labor, at small expense. When such minor repairs cost less than
one month's rent of the premises, the lessee is
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authorize_Q. to make the repair,s and charges the
expense .against his rent account. Civ. Code sec.
19,42. "When the defects are trivial, and the cost
of repairing them amounts to less than one
month's rent ,of the premises, regardless of a landlord's covenant to repair, the only remedies which
the lessee has for the landlord's failure to repair
is to either vacate the premises or make the repairs and charge the expense to the rent account
pu~suant to seetion 1942, Civil Code. It is the
settled law of this state that, in the absence of
fraud or deceH on the part of the landlord in
'concealing latent defects of which he has knowledge, .and in the a1bsence of a direct covenant to
make repairs, the le·ss,or is not liable to the tenant
or others fo,r injuries resulting from defects in
·the rented premises. 15 Cal. Jur. 704; 16 R. C. L.
1059, se'c. 580; 1 Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant,
5!5·6, sees. 86, 87; Carty v. Blaut•h, 169 Gal. 713,
716, 147 P. 949; Gately v. Campbell, 124 Cal. 520,
57 P. 5'67; Daley v. Quick, 9'9 Gal. 179, 33 P. 859;
De Motte v. Arkell, 77 Cal. App. 610, 621, 247 P.
254; Hasse}l v. Denning, (Cal. App.) 258 P. 426;
8melser v. Deutsche, etc., Kirche, ('Cal. App.) 263
P. 838. A landlord is not an insurer ,of his demised
premises against damages or injuries. He be·comes liable for injuries or damages only when
his conduct amounts to fraud or deceit, such as a
failure to distclose the existence of hidden defects
of whic;h he has knowledge, and which m,ay not be
discovered by the use of reasonable diligence on
the part of the lessee. T'he doctrine of caveat
emptor ordinarily app[ies to the leasing of premises. It is the· duty of the renter to exercise reasonable ·Catre and diligence in inspecting the premises which he proposes to rent. Even when the
landlord has covenanted to repair defects, or i~
guilty of constructive fraud in concealing hidden
defetcts of which he has knowledge, the lessee may
not recover damages when his own negligence
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Mansell v. Hoods, (Mass.) 126 N. E. 391. A radiator
exploded by reason of some defective mechanical condition. The Massachusetts court stated the law with reference to the subject matter in the following lang,uage:
''If there is a ·concealed defect that renders
the premises dangerous which the tenant cannot
discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
of which the landlord has .or ought to have knowledge, it is the landlord's duty to disdose it, and
he is lia1ble for an injury which results from his
concealment of it.' Booth v. Merriam, 155 Mass.
521, 5'22, 30 N. E. 85; Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 1\iass.
471, 475, 18 N. E. 397, 1 L. R.. A. 429. But even
if it is assumed that the jury would have been warranted in finding that when the plaintiff examined
the premises the ·Cheek valve was not pJainly
visible, and could have been located only after investigation by a competent mechanician, she
failed to offer any evidence which would justify
a finding that the defendant knew, or ·had knowledge of any circumstances from which such a
result ·could be inferred, or that t·he hot water system had been so defe.etively installed that its use
might cause an explosion of the radiators. If the
defendant did not know of any concealed defeet
or conditions which might make the use of t·he
premises dangerous, no liability has been shown,
and the verdicts were ordered rightly.''

Widmar v. Healey, 159 N. E. 874. A stove expJoded
and the tenant claimed that it was defective but finally
relied upon the f.act that ice bad a0cumula ted in a pipe
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leading from the .stove. L1iability was denied in the following language :
'·'Even if the allegations of the complaint had
been supported by evidence, no cause of action
would have existed. No covenant to repair is alleged. Neither does the complaint state that defen~_ant fraudulently concealed defects.
In the
absence of fraud or of a covenant, a lessor does
not represent that the premises are tenantaJble and
may be used for the purposes for which they are
apparently intended.''

Morrow v. Otis, (Mass.) 146 N. E. 3-63. An action by
tenant against landlord for injuries claimed to have been
caused in permitting gas and heating appliances to become defective and to be and remain out of repair, and
in knowingly letting to the plaintiff a ro-om wherein the
gas fixtures and appliances were defective. T·here, a.s
here, inquiry was m·ade as to whether the appliances were
safe and the tenant was assured that they were. The room
was oecupied only three nights during which time there
wa-s no trouble from escaping gas. The next night the
tenant was taken si·ck by reason of es·caping gas. The
Massa1chusetts Supreme Court denied liability in the following language :
''The unexplained escape of gas from a fixture
owned by the defendants is of itself no evidence
of their negligence. Mur1lhY v. Boston Elevated
Railway, 229 Mlas·s. 38, 118 N. E. 191. If there
were a defect, its nature and the time when .it
came into existence were mwtters of conjecture,
and it did not appear that the most careful inspection on the part -of the defendants would have
disdosed it. * * *
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''The plaintiff ennnot recover on the ground
that Mrs. Otis stated to her in substance that t·he
gas fixture was all right, when she knew or should
haYe known that it was defective. The evidence is
not sufficient to prove that when the room was
let the defendants knew, o:r in the exercise of reasonable 0are should ·have known, that the fixture
was defective or that any repairs were needed on
it.''
\\T·hat, if any, evidence, therefore, was there of the
existence of hidden, concealed or latent defects within the
premises which were or should have been known to defendant M·otor Park and which were or should not have
been known to plaintiff~ Was any such hidden, concealed
or Iratent defect, assuming one to have existed, the proximate cause of the explosion~
Plaintiff's answer undoubtedly will be t'hat there i,s
evidence in the reeO'rd t1o the effect that there had been
odors of gas in the vicinity of the ;cottages in question
prior to the time of the explosion and that the defendant
wa·s informed of such fact.
It is true that ·certain witnesses testified that there
had been ·odors of g1as at diffe1rent points in the Motor
Park. The defendant M·otor Park not only admitted that
such had been the ca.se but the manager, Mr. Lindholm,
testified th'at in the operation of a motor park or apartment house where 113 ·Out .of the 125 cottages or apartments are equipped with ga-s appliances, such oc;currences
are not unusual. In many .of the cottages there were not
only gas appHrances for heating but in addition a range
or gas plate burner for cooking. He explained that in
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the operation of these appliances parts become worn
through constant use by the tenants themselves. He also
explained that the telllants will ·sometimes fail to entirely
close a gas jet, by reason .of which a gas odor will result.
Als~o, since most of these appliances are equipped with
a pilot light it is not unusual for the pilot light to become extinguished and that a ~as odor results. There
are many other sour:ces of gas odors in the operation of
such an establishment. He explained that in each and
every instance the gas 'Company was called, an inspection
made and repairs effected.
But plaintiff wiH state there is evidence of Mrs.
Bussell to the effect tha:t on January 2nd OT 3rd, 1938
(prior to the time when plaintiff rented her apartment}
there was a stl'long odor of gas in the garage or driveway separating the Bussell cottage from the Wheeler
cottage immediately to the east of the Loos cottage, and
M-rs. Bussell testified that she notified the office of the
defendant Motor Park of the fact t·hiat there was a gas
odor in the vicinity of that cottage. She also testified
that again on January 17th (after M1rs. Loos was in possession ·of her eottage) she observed that the odor of gas
was particularly strong in the g;arage s·eparating the
Bus·seH ·Cottage from the Wheeler cottage, and that stle
again notified the office of the Motor Park of such fact.
While this evidence was denied by Mr. Sheets, to whom
she testified she made the report, we must assume for
the purpose of this appe1al that her evidence was correct.
While her direct evidence was to the effect that the Motor
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aminaHon (Ab. 39) that a boy was sent to look a.t it and
that she was not in the Wheeler cottage when the boy
was there, and that she did not know ''rhat the officials
of the Motor Park did about it.
By the testimony of Mrs. Graham, housekeeper f·or
the defendant Motor Park it was subsequently shown
that the l ast incident, to-wit, January 17th (Ab. 62-63)
occurred by reason of the fact that the Wheeler's on a
Sunday morning (Mrs. Bussell having established this
incident as occurring ·on a Sunday morning) had placed
a can of water ove1r the floor heater, which had be-come
tipped over and extinguished the pilot light, causing an
odor of gas, and that upon relighting of the pilot light
the gas ·Odor disappeared.
1

Mr. and Mrs. Loos occupied their cottage for over a
week before the explosion. Neither one of them ever
smelled any odor of gas in or about t·he same. During
that time they operated both the gas heater and the
range. Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler occupied the east portion
of the cottage during that entire period .of time, and for
many weeks prior to that. Their cottage was equipped
with both a gas heater and a range. Mr. and Mrs. Loos
and Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler used these appliances frequently. Plaintiff and her husband prepared their breakfast
and dinner in the cottage.
If, during this period of time, there had been any
es·cape of gas either into the Loos cottage or into the aTea
beneath it, the gas would have ignited from any one or
more o.f these various operations of gas appliances. This
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court will certainly take judicial notice .of the fa•ct that
with two gas ranges and two gas heating appliances operating in a cottage it would have been impossible for a
gas leak to 'have been present in those cottages without the
gas having become ignited. Also this court will take
judicial notice of the fa,ct that if there had been any escape of gas prior to the time ·of the explo.sion to the area
beneath the Loos cottage it would have been manifest to
Mr. and Mrs. Lo.os during the seven or eight days when
they occupied the premises before the explosion.
Was the fact that Mrs. Bussell might have smeHed
the odor .of gas in the garage or driveway evidence of the
fa:ct that there was a leak in the gas mains? Certainly
not, any more than it was evidence of the fact that the
Wheelers had failed to light their pilot light or the fact
that the Wheeler·s ·or Loos had failed to entirely close
their gas jets in the ·operation of their appliances. Is
there any evidence of the f.act that the gas causing the
odor which Mrs. Bussell smelled on or about January
17th caused the explosion in question? If there was any
such inference it certainly disappeared in presence of
the positive evidence of Mrs. Graham to tihe -effect that
it was caused by an extinguished pili01t light in the Wheeler cottage, and the fa:ct that gas .odors occurred from
many different sou]}ces. It certainly was no evidence of
the fact that there was a hidden, concealed structural
defect of which defendant Motor Park had knowledge,
such as to create liability under the cases heretofore
submitted.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
That there were or might have been gas odors is no
evidence of the fart that the gas ca:me fro,m any particular source and would not relieve plaintiff of the responsibility of proving that the gas came from leaky or
defective pipes as alleged in the eomplaint, and that the
leaky or defe·ctive pipes were caused' ·by defe,ct as alleged
in the complaint.

Hernandez v. Southern California Gas Co., (CaL
1931) 2 Pac. (2d) 360:
"Assuming that the defendant was negligent in
having some leaks in its pipes, no evidence was
introduced sho-wing that any of t'hose leaks led
to the sewer, and the uneontradicted evidence
is that the escaping gas would rise and not fall,
and that it could not fall below the water level
down into the sewer which was lower than the
top of the water. It thus appears that t'here was
no evidence showing that '·the thing which caused
the injury' W3JS under the management of the defendant or that it belonged to the defendant, or
that the defendant was in any way responsible for
injuries caused by it. ' '
St. Marys 'Gas Company v. Brodbeck, 151 N. E. 323.
We respectfully submit that ·the trial eourt erred in
failing and refusing to grant the motion for non-suit
and directed verdict.
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POINT II.
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAD NO
APPLICABILITY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK?
(Assignments of Error VIII and IX).

In the absence of any direct evidence as to either
the presence of a hidden or latent defect or of any knowledge •On the part of defendant Motor Park with reference
to it, defendant requested the trial court .to instruct the
jury to the effect that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
had no applicability in determining the liability of the
Motor Park in the case. These requests were known as
Request No. 2 (Alb. 77) and 2-A (Alb. 77-78). Both of
these requests weTe refused by the tri·al court so far a.s
the defendant M.otor Park was concerned. The gas company made a similar request so far as it was concerned,
which was granted and incorporated in the instructions
to the court, being Instruction No. IX (.A'b. 92-93). The
trial court did, however, give instruction No. V to the
effect that before the jury would have the right to infer
negligence on the part of defendant Motor Park from
t·he mere happening .of the explosion, that the plaintiff
must establish that the appliances within or beneath the
premises involved in the explosion were under the exclusive control of the defendant Motor Park. While this
instruction No. V was not of itself err•oneous because
it correctly state.s the law, it was not the instruction to
which the defendant Motor Park was entitled under the
law. They were entitled to the same positive, unequivocal
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and direct instructi.on to the effect that under the evidence and pleadings there wa.s no inference of negligence at all, such as w.as given so far as the gas company
was concerned. The positive evidence of every witness
was to the effect that all the appliances within the demised premises were under the ·Control of .the tenants,
including MT. and Mrs. Loos and the Wheelers, and there
was no ·conflict of evidence on the subject. Plaintiff's own
complaint alleged that the gas was supplied and controlled by the gas -company, and the only evidence upon
the subject was that o.f Mr. Lindholm (Ab. 6·6) that the
gas ·company controlled the supply of gas and the Motor
Park had nothing to do with it, and it was the duty of
the trial court under the pleadings and under the uncontradicted evidence to instruct the jury positively and
directly that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no appli·cability in the ease. By giving instruction No. V, permitting the jury to speculate upon this issue, with reference to which there was no conflict, and by giving a positive instruction so far as the gas company was concerned,
the effect was to leave the M.otor Park in an unfavorable
position by permitting the jury to assume that there
might be some doubt upon the subje.ct matter ·so far as
the Motor Park was concerned. Particularly was this
situation prejudicially damaging and erroneous when
taken in connection with other instructions hereinafter
referred to, wherein the court assumed to direct the jury
not once but several times that there were leaky and defective pipes, and that the gas causing the explosion came
fr.om such source.
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Under the uncon tradi·cted evidence and under the
pleadings the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no applicability in this case, and we respectfully submit that
under all of the authorities the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur never can have applicability where two parties
are 0harged as being j.ointly responsible for the injury.
The applicability of this doctrine has been considered
by this court in several oase-s.

Quinn v. Gas & Coke Company, 42 Utah 113. Plaintiff, a customer of the gas company, ·called at the office
to pay her bill. 'There was ink on the counter which injured her wearing apparel.

There w.a.s no· evidence as

to who placed the ink on the counter. Plaintiff recovered
and this ·Court reversed the judgment, stating as follows:
"'The doctrine is elementary that in cases
where the maxim of res ipsa loquitur does not apply, negligence may not be presumed or inferred
merely because an aJccident ·Occurred. In this case
aU that is shown is that a bottle or well c.ontaining ink, in some way unknown, was overturned,
and that the ink was spilled, and some of it
dripped upon respondent '·s dres.s and damaged it.
At most, therefore, the case falls within the familiar doctrine that 'when a plaintiff pr.oduces evidence that is consistent with an ~hypothesis that
the defendant is not negligent, and also with one
that he is, his proof tends to show neither.'
(Ewing v. Goode, (C. C.) 78 Fed. 444.) Is it not
just as reas~onable to infer that the ink was accidentally ·spilled as to infer that it was negligently
done~ * * * Under su1ch cir,cumstances a finding of negligence can only be based upon conje.cSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ture. Mere conjeiCture, however, cannot support
a finding of negligence.''
KendaJl v. Fordhant, 79 Utah 256, 9 Pac. (2d) 183.
This is an action for the negligent 'burning of a wheat
field. Defendant park·ed his autom.obile on plaintiff's
premises and immediately thereafter the autonwbile
began to burn, .spreading to the wheat field. There was
no evidenee as to how the fire started. The trial court
submitted the case to the jury upon the doctrine of res
ipsa l.oquitur, and this court reversed the case, stating as
follows:
"'There is no evidence in this case which tends
to show what started the fire in defendant's automobile, and therefore the court was in error in
permitting the jury to speculate as to its origin.
The burden was on the plaintiffs to produce some
proof that the fire in defendant's automobile was
caused by the negligence of the defendant before
they were entitled to have that question submitted
to the jury. The law applicable to a state of facts
such as is here presented is thus stated in 11 R.
C. L. 955:
" 'It is the well established generai rule that
the destruction of property by fir·e, either upon
the premises where it starts or is kindled, .or on
·other property to which it is communicated, does
not raise a presumption of negligence, either in
the kindling or management of the fire, and that
in all such cases the burden of pro.of is upon the
plaintiff to show that the dam•age was caused by
the negligence of the party kindling the fire or
allowing the same to spread. Negligence or misconduct, being the gist of the a•ction, must be
proven. The circumstances under whieh a fire ocSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~curs

may, however, sometimes be such as to justify the application of the doctrine of res ispa
loquitur, and impose upon the defendant the burden of proving his freed.om from fault.'
''No claim is here made, nor can the .claim he
maintained, that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur has any application to the facts disclosed by the evidence in this ease, nor can it be
said that parking an automofbile ,on or near dry
June grass adjoining a wheat field is an act of
negligence.''
succes~sfully

Jenson v. S. H. Kress & Company, 87 Utah 434, 49
Pare. (2d) 9'58. This was an action for damage-s claimed to
have been sustained by a customer from broken glass
upon a display counter in the store. There was no evidence as to how the glass got cracked or how long it had
been ·cracked before the plaintiff was •cut by it. The trial
court submitted the CJase to the jury upon the doctrine of
res ipsa Loquitur. In reversing the judgment for plaintiff this court, in a unanimous opinion written by Mr.
Jus'tice Wolfe, used the following language:
''We cannot ·see how this case differs from
the Quinn Case. In that case a bottle of ink had
spilled, and plaintiff's dres~s was damaged by ink
running upron it. In this case there was a cracked
panel in the s'how case and the person of plaintiff
was injured. In neither case did any one know
how the ink was spiilled or the glass broken. In
bo·th cases the cause of the .spilled ink or the
broken glass may have been caUJSed by the ·customer who was damaged or by another customer,
·Or may hav·e been caused by some representative
of tJhe company without negligence and unnoticed
when it was done, or, in bot'h C~ases, it may have
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been caused by the negligence of the company
through a servant. The difficulty is that it is in
the realm .of speculation, and under such Clircum.stances the d01ctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot
apply. It applies where the thing from or by
which the apparent negligence speaks is shown
to be under t'he control or the management of the
store and the accident is such, as, in the. ordinary
•Course of things, does not or would not happen
if those who had t'he management used the
proper care. Where the way in which the accident
happened warrantts a.n inference of negligence,
then t'he mere happening speakJs for its·elf. Even
then it is only evidence from which the jury may
infer negligence. It is not negligence in law. See
Williamson v. Salt Lake & Ogden R. Co., 52 Utah
84, 172 P. 680, L. R. A. 1918F, 588. If the circumstances are equally consistent with a cause
which would not be attributable to negligence,
then the doctrine does not 1apply. * * * In
the instant cBJse it was just as ·consistent tha.t the
plaintiff herself or some other customer had
leaned against the showcase, wrenching the panels
and thus splitting off a piece of gla·s,s, as if the
defendant had done i1t negligently.''
It seems to us that the Kress case is upon all fours
with the ·one at bar. No one testified in the case at bar as
to how the explosion occurred, namely, :whether there was
~some broken or defective pipes, ·O·r whether t'he gas which
caused the explosion came fr·om an open gas jet f·or which
some tenant was responsible, or whether it WBJS from some
accidental rupture ·Of a pipe or connection at the particular moment, for which defendant would not be responsible, or from some imperfeet or defective conneetion owing to faulty manufacture f.or which defendant Motor
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Park certainly would not be responsible, or from some
other 'source. As to this the record is a:bsolutely ,silent. The
entire sulbject matter was left to the specu1ation of the
jury exactly as in the eases which we have cited.

Stanolind v. Bwnce, (Wyo. 1936) 62 Pac. (2d) 1297.
Plaintiff wars injured by explosion of a gas heater in the
baseme-nt of a dormitory. Plaintiff owned the gas heater
but the employees operated it. Defendant also furnished
the ga'S which exploded. The case was tried upon the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. An employee superintendent of the gas plant was joined as a defendant with the
ga,s comp:any.
"It 1s averred by the plaintiff and denied by
the defendants that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which was undertaken to be applied to the
fa,cts herein, by the district court, through its instructions to the jury, was properly invoked. T'hat
doctrine as stated by the Supreme Court of the
U·nited St'ates in San Juan Light & T. Co. v. Requena, 22·4 U. S. 89, 32 8. Ct. 399, 401, 56 L. Ed.
680, is that, 'when a thing which causes injury,
without fault of the injure'd person, is shown to
be under the e~clusive control of the defendant,
and the injury is such as, in t'he ordinary course
of things, does not o:eoor if the one having such
con'trol uses proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that the
injury arose fr·om the defendant '.s want of care.'
''Of simi1ar import are the essentials of the
doctrine as well phrased by Dean Wigmore, 5
Wigmore on Evidence ( 2d Ed.) 498, sec 2509,
thus:
'' '(1) The apparatus must be such that in
the ordinary instance no injurious operation is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspe·ction, or user; (2) Both inspection and
user must have been at the time of the injury in
the .control of the party charge'd; (3) The injurious occurrence or oondition must have happened
irrespective of any voluntary action at the time
by the party injured.' ''

* * * * * *
"It is also to be observed that the doctrine
will not be applied if there is any other re·asona1>1e or probable •cause from whi~h it might be inferred there \Yas no negligence at all; nor does
it apply in any instance when the agen:cy causing
the a·c~cidenf is not under the 1sole and exclusive
·control of the per.s·on 'sought to be charged with
the injury.''
*

*

*

*

*

*

"In t'he second place, we think that neither
of these two instructions should have been given.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not in our
judgment applicable to the facts of this case as
disclosed by the record bef.ore us. Taking the
three e~ssentials of the rule as l•aid down by Mr.
Wigmore, and whi,ch ·we regard as both sound and
salutary, and througili them s-crutinizing the facts
·before us, we ·note that the healter in question, a
standard equipment, w•as apparently one such that
ordinarily no injurious operation was to be expected unless from a 'careless cons•truction, inspection, or user,' thus squaring with the first essential aforesaid.
''With the ·Sec•ond and third enumerated essential-s, the facts of this recor'd do not conform.
As to the second ·One, it is evident t'hat while the
linspeetion ·o.f the heater was con trolled by the defendant oompany, its user at the time of the injury
was not. The plaintiff himself was using the
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heater then. He had gone down to the basement
to lig'ht the gas, as he had done, so he say1s, quite
'a few tim.es before; he was an employee who had
worked around gas for many years, and was undoubtedly familiar with its properties. He opened
the door of the heater; he turned off the gas and
returned shortly thereafter and attempted to turn
it on again and light a.t, and the explosion happened. This was certainly use on his part o.f the
device in que,stion at the time of the injury quite
as obviously as wa·s a person's sitting down on a
:chair, pushing a •swing door, or pressing an electric switch. Webster's N.ew International Dictionary (2d.Ed.) defines the veJ.'fb 'use' as 'to make
use of; to avail one's self of; to employ.' As to the
heater, this the plaintiff undoubtedly did."
In the most recent ca:se of Hohnema·nn v. Pacific
Gas & Ele1ctric Compavny, decided Nov. 25, 1939, 96 Pac.
(2d) 350, t'he District Court of Appeals of the First District of ·California -considered the applica:bility of the
doctrine of res irps·a loquitur to a case of this kind. The
injuries resulted from a gas e:x;plosion and the gas company obtained a drirected verdict upon the ground that
if the ga·s passed the meter into the appliances of the
consumer that the direction, management, control and
regulation ·of the gas was in exclusive posses.sion ·of the
o.wner of the building, and that under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur the ·only negligence .shown was that of the
owner ·of the premises. It was an a:partment house and
the particular apartment ci.n que·s'tion had been vacant f.or
some time.

Evidence wa1s presented from which an

~n

ference 'might arise that the pipe wa1s uncapped at the
time of the ex,plosion, but t'here was no direct evidence
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as to exactly how the accident occurred or as to who ·was
responsible for the condi'tion. It might have occurred in
any one of several ways. There was no direct evidence
upon the subject matter as in the case at bar. Contributory negligence was established, as before stated, by application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur a·s against
decedent. On the ot'her hand, the heirs ·of decedent claimed
that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the gas company was lialble. Concluding that the trial court was in
error in directing the verdict in favor of the ga·s company,
the appellate Court ·considered the applicahility ·of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to :eases of this kind as follows:
'''The rule ·o.f res ips·a loquitur, en1bodied in
the phrase 'the thing speaks for itself,' has been
held at times to include within its indefinite ·scope
t'he modern use of vehicles, ma·chines, articles of
different kinds and even livestock when the owne1·,
operator or person in control, or party responsible
for the maintenance or management of tihe instrumentality, is, by reason of his H·ccessibility, in
a position to give an explanation of the oc:eurrence
of the accident. On account of fast changing
phases of modern life, no precise rule may be
stated to cover this doctrine except to say that
the injury must lbe such 'as would not have oeeurred eX'cept throu~h the negligent con'·struction
or improper use of ~he instrumentality by the
party having exdusive control thereof.
''Regardless ·of its enlarged s-cope, we still
fail to agree with defendant that the maxim ·orf
res ipsa 'loquitur may he invoked b~T a defendant
against a. plaintiff under the issues and facts of
this ca·se. No authority upholding such theory
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has been suggested. A plainmff ·c.alled upon under
the maxim of res ipsa 1oquitur to explain the cause
·of an injury, would he doing only that which is
now required, namely, proving, by a preponderance of t'he evidence, the ·affirmative allegations
of the 0omplaint.
''Conceding for the sake of discussion, but
not deciding, that under certain facts not involved
in this ·case the maxim of res ip·sa loquitur may be
invoked by each ,side, the instrumentality causing
the injury must be under the ex-clusive •control of
the party agalinst whoin the rule is invoked. In
this case the meter was exclusively owned and
con'trolled by defendant ·0orporation; the pipe and
;cap thereon exclusively •by the decedent. In other
words, neither the decedent nor the defendant had
control of both the ·swivel connection ·o.f the meter
and the pipe and cap thereon in the apartment.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable
unless the party agailllst whom the rule is inv·oked
has not only accessibility to t'he facts of the case
hut a beter opportunity, hased upon knowledge
of surrounding fa,cts, ·of explaining tihe ·occurrence.
:Scellars v. Universal Service, 68 .Cal. App. 252,
228 P. 879. Under the facts of this case the rule
wrus not applicaible to either side. The difference
between the case of Chutuk v. Southern Calif.ornia
Gas Co., supra, relied upon by respondent ·On this
point, and the present one is "that in the Chutuk
case the defendant gas company, irrespective of
the location eit'her on or off ·o.f plaintiff·s' property,
of the gas pipe and riser -causing the injury, retained complete charge and ·control of such in'strument-ality. In this case the instrumentality
was under the control ·O.f deeedent or defendant,
but not of both.''

See also Gerdes v. Pacific Gas dl; Electric Co·., et al.,
(Cal. 1932) 13 Pac. ('2d) 393.
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In Yiew of the fact that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has no applicability to this case, and in view of
the fact that the court erred in failing to so instruct the
jury, we respectfully submit that not only did the trial
court err in this regard but that through elimination of
this doctrine the trial court erred in refusing to grant the
motion for non suit and for directed verdict as previously argued, in that there was no evidence whatsoever
of the specific acts of negligence alleged in the eomplaint.
POINT III.
DID THE COURT ERR IN REPEATEDLY ASSUMING AND STATING TO THE JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE
SYSTEM OF PIPES WITHIN THE MOTOR PARK WAS DEFECTIVE,

LEAKING,

AND

THAT GAS

WAS

ESCAPING

THEREFROM, AND THAT THE GAS WHICH CAUSE'D THE
EXPLOSION AND INJURY TO PLAINTIFF CAME FROM DEl!'ECTIVE OR LEAKING PIPES? (Assignments of Error III,
IV, V and VI).

The principal issues in this case so far as defendant
Motor Park is concerned were as to whether the pipes
and connections were defective and leaking, and as to
whether defendant Motor Park knew of such fact. It
therefore was incumbent upon plaintiff to establish the
;source ·of the gas which caused the explosion, namely,
whether it was from leaky or defective pipes, from
valves left open by tenants, from sudden breaking of a
pipe or connection, from some cause or reason, whether
known or unknown to defendant, or from .some cause
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wholly unknown. Of course in plaintiff's complaint she
had alleged that the gas leak was due to the fact that
the building had settled upon some pipe extending
through a partition between the erust and west apartments. It was therefore a very material question in
the case and important that the jury first and foremost
determine the ~s~ource of the gas which caused the explo.sion. If plaintiff was able to establish what she alleged
in her complaint, namely, that there was faulty construction and that we knew or should have known of such
fact, then a cause of action might be proved, but if,
on the other hand, there was no evidence of such fact
but the source ,of gas was unknown excepting by speculation of the jury, then no cause .of action whatsoever
was ·established as against the Motor Park. Therefore,
as stated, the ·issue as to the 1source of the gas was an
important and material one. In the giving of instructions No. 4, No. 10, No. 11 and No. 12 the court invaded
the province of the jury by assuming t'hat the pipes and
c-onnections were defective, and iby assuming that the
gas which ·caused the explosion came fr·o.m that s·ource.
Instruction No. 4 was as follows :
''If you find from the evidence that the defendant Mountain Fuel Company knew that the
.system ,o.f pipes within the premises of the defendant Park Company was defective, if you find
they were, and that said pipes were leaking and
gas was escaping therefrom, it then became the
duty of the ·said Mountain Fuel Supply Company
to either see that said pipes were placed in proper
repair or to discontinue furnishing and delivering
grus on said premises until .such repairs were
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made. If, therefore, you further find from the
evidence that arter said defendant Mountain
Fuel :Supply Company had knowledge of such defective pipes, and, having such knowledge, if it
continued tQ convey and deliver gas through said
system, and gas leaked therefrom and exploded
on January 22, 1938, •causing injury to the plaintiff, she is ·entitled to judgment against said
defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company for
the injuries occasioned by such explosion.'' (Ab.
89-90).
It will be observed that while at first the trial
court ·submitted to the jury the question as to whether
the system of pipes within the premi•ses of defendant
Park Company was defective by inserting the phrase
"if you find they were", it proceeded to state as a fact
"and that said pipes were leaking and gas was escaping
therefrom", and further proceeded to a1ssume that the
pipes were •out ·Of repair and that repairs were neces'sary. And in the last part of the instruction again
assumes that the pipes were defective, that gas leaked
therefrom and exploded, and that the injury to plaintiff was caused by .such condition. Nowhere in that instruction ex:cepting in the first sentence is it left to the
jury to determine any of those facts, but on the other

hand the trialeourt assumed to state ·such to be the situation without question.
Instruction No. 10 is as follows:
''You are instructed that if you find from
the evidence that the defendant Mountain Fuel
Supply Company had no notice or knowledge that
there was gas escaping in or under cabins 303
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or 403 on the premises ,of the defendant Utah
M·otor Park, Inc., prior to the time of the .explo:sion, then you are to return a verdict in favor
of the defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company
and ·against the plaintiff, no cause of action.''
(Ab. 93).
It will be observed that the instruction assumes
that gas was escaping in or under ·cabins 303 or 403 prior
to the time of the explosion. With reference to this
there was no evidence given by anyone. The most that
could possibly be said is that Mr. and Mrs. Bussell
teS'tified that there was an rodor of gas in the garage
between the Wheeler and Bus,sell cottages.
Instruction No. 11 reads as follows:
"You are instructed that there was no· duty
imposed upon the defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company to exercise reasonable care to
ascertain whether or not service pipes on the
property of the defendant Uiah Motor Park were
free fr,om leaks or defects of which the defendant
Mountain Fuel Supply Company had no notice or
knowledge." (Ab. 93).
This instruction as·sumes that the service pipes
on the property of the defendant Motor Park had leaks
or defects.
Instruction No. 12 reads as f.oHows :
"You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence in this case that the defendant Mountain
Fuel Supply Company had no knowledge or notice
.o,f a defect in the gas pipes or appliances under
or in cabins 303 or 403 of the defendant Utah
Motor Park, Inc., from which the gas escaped
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which resulted in the explosion, then you are to
return a verdic-t in favor .of the defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company and against the plaintiff, no cause of Action." (Ab. 93-94).
This instructi,on not only assume1s that there was a
defect in the gas pipes or appliances under or in cabin
303 or 403, but also assumes that gws escaped therefrom
which resulted in the explosion .
. With the trial court in four different instructions
assuming such to be the case, there is little wonder that
the jury adopted that view, notwithstanding the fact
that it was the main issue in the case. It wou1d have
been erroneous to incorporate such assumption into one
instruction, but certainly by the oft repitition of it there
is no doubt of the fact that this error was thoroughly
prejudicial to the defendant Motor Park.
This general proposition is well stated in Thompson
on Trials, Second Edition, Vol. II, Section 2295, page
1551, as follows :

"It is error for the judge in instructing the
jury: 1. To assume the existence of material
facts which are in issue by the pleadings and
which are controverted upon the evidence.''
There are authorities cited in that

v~olume

from

many jurisdictions, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, to support that proposition.
This court in several authorities has recognized the
same principle.
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Nelson v. Lott, 81 Utah 265. The court in that case
in one of its instructi.ons stated that plaintiff was in a
place where he had a right to be. One of the is,sues
presented was as to his location. The court reversed
the decision of the lower court upon that proposition in
the fol1o,wing language:
''One of the most strenuously contested
points in the case was whether or not respondent was standing in the position he claims to have
been in when the collision occurred or stepped
suddenly into the position where he was injured
at the moment of the impact. Neither of the
parties were trespasser.s. They were invitees, and
they had an equal right to he on the premises.
But as to which of them had the right, or the
prior or superior right, to be in the particular
'Spot where the injury occurred at the time of
its occurrence, we think, in view of the conflict in
the evidence, was a question which the jury
should have been privileged to determine.''
In the case at bar the trial .court not only .stated
that the pipes and connections were defective and that
the gas causing the explosion came from that source
which caused the injury in question, but repeated the
.statement four times.

State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497. One of the issue's
in the case was as to whether the defendant Greene was
married to the woman he was living with. The evidence
upon the question was in conflict. The trial court in
the presence of the jury, in denying a motion for directed
verdict, inadvertently expressed an ·opinion upon the
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subject matter. In ordering a new trial upon this ground
this court used the following language:
""\Ve know of no rule of law that permits a judge
before whom a case is being tried to express his
opinion in the presence .of the jury and in their
hearing as to the weight of the evidence on a
controverted question of fact. But, on the contrary, the authorities uniformly hold that for
him to do so is error. * * *
"\Vhile it is apparent from the record that
the remarks complained of were purely inadvertent, and \vere not intended to influence the
jury, yet this fact does not render them any
less prejudicial to the defendant than if the
judge had deliberately and intentionally made
them for the express purpose of impre,ssing upon
the jury his opinion respecting the guilt or innocence of the defendant.''
Of course in the case at bar the trial court deliberately and intentionally stated these facts in f,o,rmal instructions, which made them all the more impressive,
and then to be sure that they were impressive repeated
it.

Marti v. American Smelting d!; Refining Company,
23 Utah 52. An instruction a·ssuming that plaintiff had
been damaged was held to be erroneous and prejudicial
in the following language :
''By this instruction the court assumes that
the plaintiff had proven his damages since the
twenty-first day of June, 1899, and the jury were
only limited in their inquiry as to the amount of
such damages from that date. Under such in·structions the jury were left to a·ssess the damSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ages. It is true that in another part of the charge
the jury were told that they were the judges
of the facts and the credibility .of the witnesses,
but we can not presume that the erroneous effect
of the former was eliminated fr.om their minds
by the latter instruction.
''The questi,on passed upon by the court was
a que,stion of fact for the jury to determine. The
defendant must have been prejudiced by the
instruction given.''

Hawley v. Corey, 9 Utah 175. The trial court in'structed the jury to the effect that a certain contract
was made. Thereafter when the court's attention was
called to the fact that there was a dispute upon that
point, the court, by formal instruction, stated that he
was wr,ong in so instructing, withdrew the instruction,
and submitted the question to the jury as to whether or
not a contract had actually been made.

In reversing

the case this court used the following language:
''A perusal ·of it, we think, will convince any
one that it was not a very clear and explicit
declaration of the law governing the case. One
of the most vigorously contested questions in the
whole case, as appears by the evidence in the
record, was the question whether or not any contract whatever had ever been made between plaintiff and defendants. The court :first told the jury
that this was a conceded fact. When they were
·Called back into court he informed the jury that
his instructions were wrong in one particular,
perhaps two. First: 'I instructed y~ou it was
·conceded that the contract f.or this work was
made. Counsel say that is not true.' Thereupon
the court gave an instruction upon this question.
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struction, would unquesti~onably get the impression that the oourt eonsidered it a settled question fron1 the proof that the contraet was made
as daimed by the plaintiff, but that out of deference to the denial of counsel it was formally submitted to them to be passed upon. It is true
that counsel in their exception called the attention
of th~ court to the fact that the defendants denied
the contract both in their pleadings and in the
testimony in the most positive terms, and this
denial did not rest, as ·stated by the court, with
the counsel, but with the parties and witnesses in
the action. The question should .have been .submitted to the jury, without any expression of
opinion fron1 the court, for them to find whether
or not a contract had been made.''
There are numerous authorities f~om other jurisdictions upon the subject. \V e call the court's .attention
to a few of them without quotation because to do so
would unduly lengthen this brief. We assume this oourt
will read the fol1o·wing authorities:

Montgomery Ward & Oompa;ny v. Arbogast,
(Wyo. 1938) 81 Pac. (2d) 885;
Carpenter v. Oonnecti'cut General Life Ins.
Co., (C. C. A.lO, 1933) 68 Fed. (2d) 69;
Jessup v. Davis, (Neb.) 211 N. W. 190.
Mcl(eon v. Lissner, (Cal.) 223 Pae. 965. This case
is peculiarly in point as it involves an .accident alleged
to have occurred through failure to k~ep appliance~s in
repair.
Cheney v. Buck, 189 Pac. 81; 56 Utah 29.

The

trial ·court refused to give an instrucHon in that case
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which assumed a fact in issue. In sustaining the action
of the trial court, this eourt used the following language:
''By this instruction the court was requested
to assume and tell the jury as a matter of fact
that respondent was on the wrong side of the
roadway. The court was asked to tell the jury
it was respondent's duty to 'pass ar·ound the intersection of the main public highway and Gentile
Street.' Thi,s instruction, with others requested
by appellant, would have invaded the province of
the jury and would have taken from the jury
issues that were for them, and not for the .court,
to decide. The requests were properly refused,
and it would have been error to have given them
or either of them.''
Kellems v. Schiele,
(Ill. 1938) 17 N. E. (2d) 604.
POINT IV.
DID THE COURT ERR IN HOLDING THE MOTOR PARK TO THE
SAME DEGREE OF RES:PONSI:BILITY AS THE GAS COMPANY AS A SUPPLIER OF GAlS? (As.signment of Error II).

The court gave instruction No. 2 as follows:
" 'Ordinary care' I have defined for you in
a separate instruction. Y.ou are instructed further that the degree of care which one conveying
gas or ,o,ther dangerous commodities is required
to use increases in pr.oportion to the increased
danger of the commodity. The defendants, therefore, in supplying gas· to the premises occupied
by the plaintiff at and immediately before the
time of the explosion, were chargeable with that
degree of ·Care .to prevent damage to the plaintiff
which was commensurate to the danger which it
was their duty to guard against and avoid.''
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To this instruction defendant Motor Park took exception. (Ab. 97-98).
It will be observed that in defining ·ordinary care
so far as both defendants are eoncerned, the instruction
assumes that the defendant M,otor Park was engaged in
the business of supplying gas to the premises occupied
by plaintiff, and that the defendant Motor Park along
with the gas company was ,charged with a high degree
of care in the .supplying of gas to prevent damage to
the plaintiff.

In

~other

words, by this instruction the Motor Park
as a customer of the gas company and as the owner
of the premises was placed in the same position as the
gas company, the seller of the gas which was engaged in
the business of ,supplying gas. We respectfully submit
that this was erroneous and does not correctly state
the law with reference to ordinary care so far as a
landlord is concerned.
Under all of the authorities '',ordinary care'' so
far as a landlord is concerned, consists of permitting
the tenant to make inspection of the premises and of
disclosing to the tenant the existence rOrf all hidden or
latent defects ·Of which the landlord has knowledge.
Since when does the ownership of a building,
whether apartment house, store or private residence,
constitute being engaged in the business of supplying
gas and ,selling it to people who may be lawfully within

the premises 1
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The authorities are replete with cases holding public utilities engaged in the busines·s of selling gas and
other commodities to the public to a very high degree
of .care, not only in .seeing that the facilities are safe
but in seeing that the gas is shut off when the facilities
are unsafe, even though they may be upon the premises
of the customer. We know of no -authorities, however,
which hold that the customer or consumer, by having gas
installed upon his premises, becomes a public utility
and .seller of those commodities. You might just as
well state that the owner of an apartment house, store,
building or home, by reason of the fact that the premises
are equipped with lighting facilities, is engaged in the
business of selling electric power. The shoe is entirely
on the other foot. The Utah Motor Park in this case was
a customer or consumer, one step removed from Mr. and
Mrs. Loos, because they had absolutely no ·control over
either the .appliances, pipes within the building, or the
flow of gas into the premises.
In the giving of this instruction the trial court not
,only departed from the law but disregarded the evidence
and departed from the issues presented by the pleadings.
As heretofore ~stated, the complaint expressly alleged
that the gas company was engaged in the business of
·supplying gas to the premises. Nowhere in the complaint is' there any allegation to the effect that the Motor
Park had anything to do with the gas excepting as owner
of the premises. N1owhere in the evidence is there one
word with reference to the ownership of the gas within
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the cottage. The record is absolutely silent as to whether
the plaintiff was paying for the gas or whether the Utah
Motor Park was paying for the gas. There is no evidence as to whether the gas was included within the
rental charge for the cottage or whether it was something in addition. Assuming, however, that the rental
charge included the gas it ·still did not put the Motor
Park in the position of a public utility dealing with gas
which, as .stated, is a dangerous commodity handled
only by experts lawfully authorized to engage in that
business, and who under the law are held to a high degree
of responsibility.
We have hereto£ore cited cases from this court and
·others as to what the responsibility ·of a landlord is
toward his tenant. Niowhere is there any authority to
the effect that a landlord through the rental of hi's
premises changes like a chameleon fr,om a landlord to a
gas company.
This instruction is not only erroneous but doubly so
and highly prejudicial in view of the failure of the court
to instruct the jury correctly as to what the law requires
of a landlord in fulfilling his duty to a tenant, as hereinafter argued.
POLNT V.
DID

TH~

COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY

THAT THE MOTOR PARK AS LANDLORD IS NOT LIABLE
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF LATENT OR HIDDEN DEFECTS
OR

UNKNOWN

OR

UNSAFE

CONDITIONS

UPON

THE
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PREMISES, AND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF WARRANTY
THE PLAINTIFF TOOK THE PROPERTY AND RENTED THE
CABIN SUBJECT TO ALL, HIDDEN OR LATENT DEFECTS
OF WHICH THE MOTOR PARK HAD NO KNOWLEDGE, AND
THAT IF THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED BY THE UNEXPECTED BREAKING OR GIVING WAY OF SOME JOINT, PIPE,
OR CONNECTION NO LIABILITY WOULD EXIST ON THE
PART OF THE MOTOR PARK? (.A!ssignments of Error X, XI,
XII and XIII).

It was incumbent upon the trial court to instruct
the jury as to the law in the State of Utah with reference to the degree of care which a landlord owes to his
tenant. It was likewise incumbent upon the court to
outline in his instructions to the jury the legal sufficiency
of the alleged acts of negligence as constituting a cause
of action, and the legal rights and liabilities existing
between plaintiff and the defendant Motor Park in view
of the relationship of landlord and tenant.
Defendant Motor Park requested instructions upon
thi·s subject matter. They are known as requested instructions No. 4 (Ab. 78), No. 7 (Ah. 79-80), No. 8
(Ab. 80) and No. 9 (Ab. 80-81). Each and all of these
instructions were based upon the law ~announced by this
court in the cases cited under Point I.
The only place where the court came anywhere near
instructing upon this material and important propositi.on of law was in instruction No. 2 (Ab. 89) wherein it
erroneously instructed the jury that the defendant Motor
Park along with the gas company was held to the
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highest degree ·of care in the selling of gas, notwithstanding the fact that the co1nplaint alleged the gas was
sold by the gas company and not by the Motor Park,
and in instruction No·. 7 wherein it stated that in the
event the explosion occurred by reason of the existence
of a defect in the joint or connections they must find
that the defendant :Motor Park knew or had reasonable
ground to believe ·o.f the existence of the defect. This
last instruction, while correct in and of itself, was limited
in effect in that it was effectual only in the event the
jury should find that the explosion occurred by reason
of the existence of a defect. This did not satisfy the
legal duty of the trial court to instruct the jury that the
defendant :M~otor Park as landlord was liable under the
pleadings and evidence in the case only in the event
the explosion occurred by reason of the existence of
defects in the pipes or appliances of which it had knowledge. The requested instructions had for their purpose
and effect the narrowing of the issue so far as the
defendant jJoto·r Park is concerned, and the definite
and express instruction by the court as to the responsibility which a landlord owes to a tenant.
By refusing to give these instructions the court
threw it wide open to the jury to find against defendant
Motor Park upon any theory set forth in the complaint,
notwithstanding the fact that as to one of those alleged
acts of negligence, to-wit, failure to inspect, this court
in the Hatsis case definitely stated there is absolutely
no such duty upon the part of the landlord.
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We submit these assignments ,of error and this
point upon authority of the cases cited in this brief under
Point I.
POINT VI.
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO TAKE FROM THE JURY
CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN ALLEGED ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE MOTOR PARK WITH
REFERENCE TO WHICH THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE?

(Assignment of Error XIV).

In its requested instruction No. 10 (Ab. 81-82) defendant requested elimination from consideration of the
jury of two alleged grounds of negligence, namely, those
relating to the settling of the building upon pipes projecting through the partition, by reason of which the pipes
and connections were cracked and broken, and the other
alleged ground of negligence relating to the ventilators.
As heretofore argued and .submitted to the court, there
was absolutely no evidence upon either of those subjects
excepting as to, the ventilators, with reference to which
the only eJVidence was in favor of the defendant to the
effect that there were ventilators in the foundation and
that they were open.
It was error upon the part of the trial court to .submit those issues to the jury when there was absolutely
no evidence upon one subject and uncontradicted evidence in favor of defendant upon the other. The effect
was to permit the jury to speculate upon matters about
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

59
which there was no evidence or no dispute. It was a law
question for the court, not a question of fact £or the jury.

Eklwnd v. lJtlet. Life Ins. Co., 89 Utah 273.
In the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 72 Utah
366, in reversing the case for improper instructions,
this court used the following language:
"Thus the charge falls within the familiar rule
that it is error to give instructi·ons based on
a state of facts which there is no evidence tending to prove, or which the undisputed evidence
in the case shows did not exist, even though such
instructions contain correct statement·s of law.''
See 64 C. J. 312:
"Evidence which merely makes it possible for
the facts in issue to be as alleged, or whir~h raises
a mere conjecture, .surmise, or suspicion, presents
no question of fact for submission to fhe jury,
and should not be left to the jury, it being err·or
to do so, the rule being that, to justify submis,sion
to the jury, the proof must be sufficient to raise
more than a mere conjecture ·Or surmise that the
fact is as alleged. * * * However, where
there is no evidence to support ·an issue, it should
not be submitted to the jury, and it is erroneous
to do s·o, s·o that a refusal of the .court to ,sulbmit
the issue is proper, and such issue may properly
·be withdrawn from the jury."

64C.J.318:
"Where the evidence is not sufficient to justify
a submission to the jury, or to support a verdict,
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the case should not be submitted, and the court
may properly refuse to do s·o; submi,ssion in such
instanee being erroneous. So, also, where plaintiff .f·aHs to produee evidenee on an essential element ·o.f his case, and no reasonable inference can
be drawn from a fact .supported by evidence tending to prove .sueh element, it its error for the court
to submit the case to the jury."
We respectfully submit that on account of each and
all of the error•s presented herein that the trial court
erred in denying the motion for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

BADGER, RICH & RIOH,
and W. H. FOLLAND,
Attorneys for Defen.darnt atnd
Appellant Uta:h Motor Park, Inc.
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